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ABSTRACT
Martin Heidegger has retrospectively characterized his philosophy as “phenomenology of the 
invisible”. This paradoxical formula suggests that the aim of his thinking was to examine 
the origin of the phenomena. Furthermore, Heidegger has also stated that his philosophy is 
ultimately motivated by a theological interest, namely the question of God’s absence. Follow‑
ing the guiding thread of those remarks, this essay analyzes the essential traits of Heidegger’s 
thought by interpreting them as an attempt to develop a phenomenology of the invisible. Hei‑
degger’s attitude towards physics and metaphysics, his theory of truth, his reading of Aristotle, 
his concept of Dasein, his understanding of nothingness are all situated within the problematic 
context of the relation between the invisible and the revealed. Heidegger’s thought is thereby 
posited at the point of intersection of phenomenology, ontology, and theology.
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Heidegger paradoxically characterizes his own entire philosophy as “phenom‑
enology of the invisible” (Heidegger, 1986: 399). He only gives a brief explana‑
tion of this statement. He claims that every original phenomenology, i.e. any 
attempt to phenomenologically describe the origin, is by necessity a tautology. 
It is so because what it endeavors to express is not something that can be con‑
ceptually captured. Henceforth a different, metaphoric mode of speaking must 
be developed in order to express that which is tautological in its essence. Hei‑
degger’s remarks conclude his interpretation of aletheia in Parmenides where 
he observes that the “immutable heart of truth” is characterized by Parmenides 
as tautological par excellence: tauton t’en tautoi te menon kath’ heauto te keitai, 
or Selbes im Selben wohnend liegt in ihm selbst (Heidegger, 1986: 398). In other 
words, it refers to that which Plato calls auto t’auto (e.g. in Alc. 129b). In order 
to understand those statements, I’d like to show how the question of the relation 
between the hidden and the revealed permeates Heidegger’s entire thinking.
First of all, it is the essence of Heidegger’s concept of aletheia which he 
explains as the disclosure of that which is hidden, or the negation of lethe, 
thereby claiming that the primordial meaning of truth is both ontological and 
phenomenological, denoting the movement of phanein of all phainomena out 
of that which by itself remains hidden. This understanding of aletheia can be 
traced to his initial interpretation of Aristotle in the early nineteen twenties. 
This interpretation was preceded by Heidegger’s early interest in Luther, es‑
pecially the Heidelberg Theses, where interpreting Romans 1:20 (a classical pas‑
sage on the relation between the hidden and the revealed) Luther claims that 
theology should concentrate on the manifest aspect of God, i.e. manifested in 
the phenomena of the world, or id quod est (Heidegger, 1995b: 282). Further‑
more, Heidegger’s often repeated interpretative credo is to reveal “that which 
is unsaid in that what has been said”1 (Heidegger, 1976b: 203; cf. Heidegger, 
1991: 201). Finally, in one of his rare statements on God, he claims that “God 
is present only through his absence” (Heidegger, 1981: 170–171), or by the 
“absence of the hidden fullness” (Heidegger, 2000: 185). From this perspective 
I’d like to interpret Heidegger’s phenomenology of the invisible.
Heidegger’s question — as he has often stated — was the question of being. 
But it was also the question of truth. Whoever tries to understand Heidegger, 
should pose the question of the relation of truth to being, the question of on 
hos alethes, which was indeed the question he himself tried to answer in his in‑
terpretation of Aristotle. But what one should ask first is: why was Heidegger 
at all interested in the question of being and the question of truth? There are 
several hints given by Heidegger himself that allow us to answer this ques‑
tion. He confessed several times that the only question he has ever tried to 
answer was the question of God’s absence, e.g. in his 1937/1938 Retrospective 
1 All translations from German are mine — A.S.
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glance on the way: “the single question, whether God is fleeing from us or not” 
(Heidegger, 1997: 415). When we take into account Heidegger’s introductory 
remarks to the Rainer Maria Rilke memorial lecture Where are poets for? which 
formulate a diagnosis that we are living in the “night of the world” because we 
have lost our relation with the divine and therefore our task is now to restore 
it (Heidegger, 1977a: 269–270), then Heidegger’s theological stance becomes 
evident. It does not mean however that Heidegger wants to become a prophet, 
although in his voice one can sometimes sense prophetic and apocalyptic un‑
dertones, but rather that his philosophical project is constantly motivated by 
this ultimately theological interest.
Heidegger speaks about God only in apophatic terms: as that which is pre‑
sent only through its absence. God as such is unattainable for us and remains 
hidden. Only beings (phenomena) are given in our worldly, finite experience. 
Any positive statement about God would be reductive since it would reduce 
God to something particular, one among many. It would reduce the origin of 
all phenomena to a particular phenomenon. This observation, combining the 
apophatic idea of Deus absconditus with the phenomenological attitude towards 
the world, is the point of departure of Heidegger’s thinking. We can try to 
reformulate Heidegger’s question about God’s absence (or hiddenness) in a dif‑
ferent language. If all that is given are phenomena (beings) in their phanein 
(being), and the domain of beings is the world (physis), then Heidegger’s sin‑
gle question becomes the question of the possibility of metaphysics. In other 
words, Heidegger does not accept metaphysics as given. Heidegger’s question 
would therefore be: is it at all possible to move beyond the domain of physis, 
from beings to their origin, to their arche? Or, to restate it once more: is it at 
all possible to conceive a phenomenological analysis of the invisible?
In order to answer this question Heidegger performs what he calls a de‑
tour (Umweg), or a shift in thinking. If the only thing given is phenomena 
(appearances, beings) and their origin is hidden due to the mere nature of 
phenomenality (every phenomenon covers its source), then we cannot perceive 
or express the origin as such. But phenomena are not given statically. They 
are given in their phanein (appearing, being). The shift that Heidegger under‑
takes — a sort of ontological epoche — is the shift of attention from beings 
(phenomena) to their being (phanein). To summarize: what is given (revealed) 
are phenomena. What is hidden (invisible) is their origin, or that which gives. 
What Heidegger attempts to do is the shift of attention not to that which 
gives, and not to that which is given, but to the mere act of giving, to given‑
ness. This dynamic relation is the focus of Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore, 
if we accept Heidegger’s understanding of aletheuein as phanein (i.e. appearing 
of phenomena), only then can we understand why aletheia played such an im‑
portant role in his thinking as the intermediary between that which is closed 
(lethe) and that which is disclosed (beings): the opening, or the disclosure.
316 Andrzej SERAFIN
I’d like to concentrate now on the initial interpretation of aletheia as some‑
thing decisive for the development of Heidegger’s thought. Not only did he 
remain a thinker of aletheia throughout his entire life but he also pointed 
himself to this initial interpretation as the key to his thinking (Heidegger, 
2006b: 145–152; Heidegger, 2007: 93–101). He also pointed to the epigraph 
of Brentano’s study of Aristotle — to on legetai pollachos (Met. 1003a33) — as 
crucial (Heidegger, 1985: 88). This quotation from Metaphysics can indeed 
serve as a guiding thread since it shows the relation of logos (legein) to being, 
one of the core features of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of 
aletheia. I will try to show how this interpretation is Heidegger’s first attempt 
to develop a phenomenology of the invisible in which Dasein (psyche) reveals 
(aletheuei) that which is hidden (lethe), which in itself is nothing, revealing it 
as something (kata tinos). A brief sketch of this interpretation is presented in 
two chapters of Being and time, the chapters on phenomenology and on truth 
(Heidegger, 1977b: 36–52, 282–305).
First Heidegger enquires about truth in the conventional meaning, i.e. he 
tries to examine the roots of the correspondence theory of truth. Tradition 
has always referred to Aristotle’s De interpretatione to justify this understand‑
ing. Therefore Heidegger undertakes an interpretation of this treatise in order 
to examine the original Aristotelian understanding of logos and its relation to 
aletheia (Heidegger, 1976a; Heidegger, 1982; Heidegger, 2006a). It turns out 
that the classical theory of truth is absent in Aristotle. Moreover, as Heidegger 
points out, the ontological concept of truth is an essential part of Metaphys‑
ics (the final chapter of the book Theta). But the crucial Aristotelian treatise 
in Heidegger’s interpretation of aletheia is the Nicomathean ethics. Dasein is 
the term that he uses to translate psyche. Heidegger translates the Aristotelian 
statement aletheuei he psyche (Eth. Nic. 1139 b 15) as “Dasein reveals beings”.
Why Dasein instead of Seele? According to Heidegger, soul is a metaphysical 
concept overburdened with traditional understanding that obfuscates the phe‑
nomenon of psyche instead of clarifying it. The introduction of a nontraditional 
term (Dasein) is an attempt to phenomenologically describe the phenomenon 
of psyche anew. Its understanding is developed on the basis of interpreting 
Aristotle’s De anima and Nicomachean ethics. In the etymological underpin‑
ning of the native German Dasein Heidegger was able to discover a meaning 
that he could only reveal by applying this term to translate the Greek psyche. 
Henceforth Heidegger’s statements from Being and time that Sein manifests 
itself through Dasein, or that Sein is always Da, stem from this interpretation. 
If Dasein (or psyche) is the place of the manifestation of phenomena, and being 
(sein) is aletheuein, or the manifestation itself, then Da is the particularity of 
each manifestation in its particular thisness (kath hekaston).
This is related to the fundamental feature of manifestation: it is always 
a manifestation as ‑something (kata tinos). Pure self ‑manifestation would be 
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equivalent to manifestation as nothing, or to annihilation. Therefore pres‑
ence is always a presentation as something. Heidegger performs an analysis of 
this aspect of manifestation (aletheuein) in his analysis of the as ‑structure of 
logos apophantikos, i.e. legein as apophanein (manifesting). This is the subject of 
his interpretation of Metaphysics Theta 10 (he repeats it twice in: Heidegger, 
1976a: 170–182; Heidegger, 1982: 73–109). It concerns the relation of aletheia 
to logos and constitutes the cornerstone not only of Heidegger’s entire interpre‑
tation of Aristotle but also — as he claims — of the entire Metaphysics. It is not 
only a phenomenological analysis of the as ‑structure of logos (manifestation as 
something) but also a proof of the ontological and phenomenological under‑
standing of aletheia by Aristotle. In other words, it confirms the Heideggerian 
claim of the cooriginality of being and truth, or, to state it differently, it shows 
that aletheuein as a manifestation of being takes place not only in language as 
speech but also on the ontological level (logos is ontologized here).
To summarize, Heidegger’s intepretation of aletheia in Aristotle starts with 
Dasein (psyche) and its relation to the world in its manifestedness (in its being‑
ness). Various forms of this manifestation (aletheuein) are analyzed in Nico‑
machean ethics VI (Heidegger, 1992: 21–188). This is a step beyond a merely 
linguistic understanding of truth towards aletheia praktike, i.e. any form of 
embodied world experience (e.g. techne, phronesis). From this analysis of various 
modes of Dasein’s being (which is always Da) Heidegger moves to the analysis 
of manifestedness as such, or to the condition of possibility of Dasein’s being 
in the world. According to Heidegger’s analysis of the as ‑structure of mani‑
festation, the fundamental condition for any manifestation is the possibility of 
synthesis of something separate. From this Heidegger goes on to the analysis 
of the unity of a manifestation. If something manifests itself as something, 
then it is equivalent to it. But at the same time that which it manifests itself as 
must be separate in order for the relation to take place. Therefore this unity is 
from the outset divided within. This conclusion leads to an ontological claim 
that the condition of possibility of any manifestation is the division of unity, 
or ontological negation (steresis). The self ‑negation of that which is nothing in 
itself is necessary for its manifestation as something. Hence Heidegger’s analy‑
sis of aletheia leads him to what he later called lethe, or that which is hidden 
as such, which reveals itself as something in any manifestation, but manifests 
itself always as something and never as itself, since in itself it is nothing.
Lethe, the hidden fullness, is the “immutable heart” of aletheia, of any mani‑
festation, as Heidegger has stated in his late remark. He had this intuition early 
on in his thinking and his reading of Aristotle only helped him to develop a lan‑
guage to formulate this thought. He stated it for example in the motto to the 
final remarks of his 1915 dissertation on Duns Scotus: Wir suchen überall das 
Unbedingte und finden immer nur Dinge (Heidegger, 1978: 399). The Unbedingte 
that we are trying to find everywhere is the unconditioned, the “un ‑thinged”, 
318 Andrzej SERAFIN
the non ‑thing, or even the no ‑thing. Now we can clearly see how Heidegger 
follows the apophatic tradition of identifying God with nothingness (cf. Eck‑
hart’s gesture of identifying nihil of the Pauline apertisque oculis nihil videbat in 
Acts 9:8 with Deus in Sermo 71). This nothingness is the blinding divine light 
appearing to the soul as nothingness, as Bonaventura has noticed in the motto 
to Braig’s Vom Sein, one of Heidegger’s formative readings in his early years 
(cf. Plato’s figure of such light in Phaedo 99d ; Respublica 515d–e). In other 
words, from the worldly perspective, or, in Heideggerian terms, from the per‑
spective of throwness and facticity, behind everything there’s only nothing. The 
path towards this forgotten hidden fullness, towards lethe, is the path through 
which goddess Aletheia leads in the Parmenidean poem On nature. This is the 
path that Heidegger follows in his entire thinking.
One of Heidegger’s most important discoveries was the demonstration of the 
primordial unity of logos, aletheia and physis (Heidegger, 1979: 359, 371–374). 
The essence of aletheia as manifesting, as being, is movement, i.e. ceaseless dif‑
ferentiation, unfolding, unconcealing (aletheuein) of the hidden unity (lethe). 
Therefore Heidegger can claim that Aristotle’s analysis of aletheia is to be 
found not in De interpretatione (that would be a superficial, non ‑originary un‑
derstanding of truth), not in De anima, not even in Metaphysics Theta 10, but 
in Physics, which is the essential metaphysical treatise of Aristotle. Heidegger 
states this in several places, including his most important essay on Aristotle, 
On the essence and concept of physis (Heidegger, 1976b: 239–301). Hence in the 
early 1922 draft of his Aristotle interpretation Heidegger can say that “in Phys‑
ics the primordial meaning of aletheia is revealed” (Heidegger, 2005: 391). This 
primordial meaning is movedness as manifestedness. Physis is the domain of 
movement and change understood both ontologically and phenomenologically. 
Phyein denotes the essential trait of physis, i.e. being ‑moved, or, in phenomeno‑
logical terms, being ‑revealed. Phyein is cooriginal with aletheuein, as physis is 
with aletheia. This is why Aristotle describes the early physicists as filosofesantes 
peri tes aletheias (De cael. 298 b 12–14; cf. Met. 993 a–b). Therefore Heidegger 
ends his 1922 lecture course on Aristotle with a detailed analysis of Physics 
A 1–4. During a lecture given in this course on June 2nd, 1922 he translated 
aletheia for the first time as das, was nicht mehr verborgen ist, or Nicht ‑mehr ‑in‑
‑Verborgenheit ‑Sein (Heidegger, 2005: 112).
Only from this perspective can one try to answer Heidegger’s single ques‑
tion: whether God is fleeing from us or not, and what are the causes of his 
hiddenness. Heidegger’s answer is related to the way we as humans are relating 
to physis (i.e. the world as such). His criticism of technology can only be un‑
derstood from the perspective of his fundamental theological question. The at‑
titude towards physis is not of accidental interest to Heidegger but it stems from 
his aim to restitute the divine (as expressed e.g. in the Rilke lecture). To state 
it briefly, objectification of physis and the development of the subject ‑object 
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paradigm was a possible road humanity, or rather: the West could take. We 
have witnessed its advantages and disadvantages (scientific and technological 
progress), but the fundamental consequence of this approach is that physis 
became objectified, petrified, depersonalized and detheologized. Heidegger’s 
proposal of another beginning is a proposal of retheologizing or reanimating 
physis, i.e. assuming a primordial relation towards it, treating it as an animate, 
living organism that responds to us, that we are a part of, that we interact with, 
without distancing ourselves to it with gestures of objectification (Heidegger, 
1981: 49–77; Heidegger, 1983: 87–90; Heidegger, 1995a: 3–159; Heidegger, 
2000: 5–36). Physis becomes thereby a medium between the invisible and the 
revealed (manifested through phanein, aletheuein). In other words, physis is 
functionally equivalent (or cooriginal, in Heideggerian terms) to aletheia, serv‑
ing as a go ‑between, an intermediary between nothing and something, as that 
which originates the phenomena.
Furthermore, one shall emphasize that Heidegger never identifies aletheia or 
physis with God. God is something beyond, hidden, absent, but paradoxically 
present through this absence. What’s more, the absence of the absolute is the 
condition of possibility of any particularity. What is God, then? Unbekannt, 
answers Hölderlin in one of Heidegger’s favorite poems, dennoch voll eigenschaf‑
ten. Everything, every phenomenon is a property, a modus, an aspect of the 
divine nothingness, of the hidden fullness, as Heidegger describes it. Or, as 
Angelus Silesius pointedly formulated it (Scheffler, 1862: 7, 14):
Die zarte Gottheit ist ein Nichts und Übernichts:
Wer nichts in allem sieht, Mensch, glaube, dieser sieht‘s.
Gott ist ein lauter Nichts, ihn rührt kein Nun noch Hier:
Je mehr du nach ihm greifst, je mehr entwird er dir.
Heidegger’s nihilism is therefore not atheism. Just the opposite. It is an at‑
tempt of relating to that which is hidden — to the hidden fullness — from the 
perspective of that which is revealed. Aletheia, the central figure of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, is not only a reformulation of the concept of truth. It is an attempt 
to phenomenologically describe the hidden, or the invisible, in its movement 
of disclosure, i.e. in the manifestation of phenomena. But even if we treat 
each manifestation as a revelation, then we are still left only with a multitude 
of phenomena. Their origin remains hidden. Heidegger was painfully aware 
of this: “Alles Seiende mögt ihr durchstreifen, nirgends zeigt sich die Spur 
des Gottes. Frage das Seyn! Und in dessen Stille, als dem Anfang des Wortes, 
antwortet der Gott” (Heidegger, 1997: 353).
Having sketched the fundamental tenets of Heidegger’s ontological position, 
we can now briefly describe his attitude towards the tradition which is a direct 
consequence of his ontology. The notorious “destruction of metaphysics” has 
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a reconstructive undertone, clear for everyone who realizes the scope of Hei‑
degger’s project. A restatement of his goals may be necessary, though, in order 
to clarify this sufficiently. For this purpose the Platonic figure of the cave — 
which Heidegger has often commented upon (Heidegger, 1976b: 203f.; Hei‑
degger, 1988; Heidegger, 2016: 327f., 457f.) — will prove useful as a guiding 
thread. Heidegger uses two intertwined terms to diagnose the crisis of meta‑
physics: chorismos and zygon. Chorismos, or separation, denotes the yawning 
gap between the physical and the metaphysical (in theological terms: the ab‑
sence of the Divine); zygon, a term taken from Plato’s description of the cave 
allegory, denotes a yoke, a junction, or, in Heidegger’s analysis, a constant gaze 
fixed upon the sun. To state is allegorically, philosophers (metaphysicians) may 
have adapted their eyes to this unworldly light, but lost the ability to perceive 
the cave (i.e. the world), and henceforth detached themselves from life, from 
mere human existence, which should be the point of departure and constant 
reference for any metaphysics (a possibility, of course, anticipated by Plato). In 
other words, they have never returned to the cave. Heidegger’s project can be 
clearly understood from this perspective. The aim of his metaphysical epoche, 
or the “destruction of metaphysics”, is a part of the strategy whose ultimate 
goal is to reestablish the lost connection. For this purpose the Heideggerian 
philosopher has to start the ascent anew, thereby joining physis (the cave) with 
that which can only reveal itself, but is never readily given. Another feature 
of Heidegger’s stance is the vindication of the cave, of doxa, of error, and the 
demonstration of its essential relationship to truth. The ultimate question that 
Heidegger was constantly asking is: Why is there a cave (i.e. something), and 
not only the sun (seen from the cave as nothing)?
This restatement allows us to understand Heidegger’s fundamental stand‑
point. Dasein is not only psyche; Dasein is not only being ‑here; Dasein is — first 
and foremost — being ‑here ‑in ‑the ‑cave. This explains Heidegger’s strategy of 
interpretation, his retrieval of the tradition. This also explains why he never 
comments e.g. on Timaeus or Metaphysics XII, which constitute a discourse un‑
acceptable by the cave. One must first be led out of the cave, out of the domain 
of doxa. The purpose of all Heideggerian Einführungen is leading from physis 
into ta meta ta physika. The possibility of such a transition is Heidegger’s fun‑
damental problem. This perspective allows us to clarify Heidegger’s relation 
to Husserl (why he favored the early Logical investigations), to phenomenol‑
ogy (the domain of phainomena as the domain of doxa), and to existentialism 
(the concentration on finite being ‑in ‑the ‑world). Heidegger’s epoche is therefore 
different than Husserl’s, because instead of bracketing the “natural attitude”, 
Heidegger wants to revindicate it. This is why he can counter Husserl’s “return 
to the things” by saying “how can we return where we already are”. In oth‑
er words, Dasein as being ‑in ‑the ‑cave is being ‑with ‑the ‑things, being ‑with‑
‑others, being ‑embodied, being ‑affected. The entire existential analysis of Being 
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and time is a polemics with the detachment of traditional metaphysics. At stake 
is nothing less than the meaning of worldly human existence which Heidegger 
aims to restitute. Simultaneously, he attempts to reroot (radicalize) metaphys‑
ics in existence, which is best seen in his existential interpretation of Aristotle 
(Heidegger, 2002). All this leads us to the ultimate theological stake of Hei‑
degger’s thinking, the question of God’s relationship to man: whether God is 
some abstract, detached entity, away, beyond, or just the opposite, present here, 
for man, in man, as man. Heidegger clearly claims that Dasein, the domain of 
the cave, is the scene of presentation, the scene of Sein.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Heidegger, M. (1976a). Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (=Gesamtausgabe, 21). Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1976b). Wegmarken (=Gesamtausgabe, 9). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1977a). Holzwege (=Gesamtausgabe, 5). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster‑ 
mann.
Heidegger, M. (1977b). Sein und Zeit (=Gesamtausgabe, 2). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster‑ 
mann.
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